When state and local governments engage in balanced budget changes in taxes and spending, what fiscal multiplier effects do such policies have on creating local jobs? Traditionally, the view has been that possible job-creation effects of such state and local "demand-side" policies are smaller, secondorder effects. Such effects might be worthwhile to take into consideration when a state or local government balances its budget during a recession, but the effects were believed to be of modest magnitude, and not of major importance for more general state and local public policies. However, recent estimates of fiscal multiplier effects of state and local spending and tax policies suggest much larger demand-side effects of such policies on local jobs. These fiscal multiplier effects are large enough to suggest relatively low costs per job created of some tax and spending policy combinations, sufficient to alter the net benefits of many public policies. In particular, this recent research suggests that policies that use tax increases on the top 10 percent of the income distribution to finance either public spending expansions or tax relief for the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution may offer some job creation benefits that are large enough to alter state and local policy decisions. Furthermore, the cost per job created of state business tax incentive policies or business tax cuts may be significantly altered after taking into account the opportunity costs of financing such policies by cutting public spending or raising taxes on the bottom 90 percent. JEL Classification Codes: H71, H72, J23, R12
1 Back in 2001, Peter Orszag and Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz analyzed the following issue: when states need to balance their budgets during a recession, will they harm their economies less if they do so by cutting spending, or by raising taxes? Reflecting mainstream Keynesian macroeconomic thinking, Orszag and Stiglitz's (2001) memo argued that less damage is done by raising taxes than by cutting spending.
The argument is that both spending cuts and tax increases will depress demand for the state's goods and services and thereby destroy some jobs. But spending cuts do so more directly by cutting spending on goods and services produced in the state, while tax increases only depress demand for the state's goods indirectly by cutting after-tax income of state residents. Because only a portion of state residents' income is spent on goods and services produced in the state, the tax increase will not depress local demand as much. Therefore, if a state wants to preserve as many jobs as possible, it is preferable for a state to balance its budget during a recession by increasing taxes, not by cutting spending.
Orszag and Stiglitz go on to argue that in choosing among tax increases on different income groups, states might want to consider that high-income groups have a lower propensity to consume their income, and also have a lower propensity to consume local goods. Therefore, from the perspective of state policymakers, tax increases on high-income groups are likely to be less damaging to local demand for goods and services, compared to the damages from tax increases on lower-income groups.
Since 2001, much new empirical evidence has been produced on "state fiscal multipliers"-the magnitude of response of state economies to changes in public spending or taxes. This new evidence relies less on economic theory and assumption and more on good evidence from "natural experiments" of how state economies respond to fiscal shocks. What 2 does this new evidence imply for state fiscal policies? This issue is the focus of this paper. As part of this discussion, this paper also highlights that state fiscal multipliers have broad implications for many state policies, not just that of what to do about state budget deficits during a recession. State fiscal multipliers have important implications for state job creation efforts, the benefit-cost analysis of state spending programs, state tax incentive policy, state business tax policy, and state tax policies in general.
TRADITIONAL CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON STATE/LOCAL FISCAL MULTIPLIERS
Based on economic theory, what would we predict for the magnitude of state fiscal multipliers? What would be our prediction for the cost of creating one job in a state due to spending increases or one job due to tax reductions?
For state spending on goods and services, our prediction is that in the first round, each dollar spent would increase state output by the same amount. That induced increase in state output would in turn increase spending on other state goods and services by some fraction between zero and one, with that fraction depending upon to what degree businesses and governments in the state use in-state suppliers, and also depending upon to what degree consumers in the state buy goods and services produced in the state. We can refer to this fraction as the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) for state goods and services, but with the following two understandings: 1) This MPC depends not only on consumer behavior but on business behavior.
2) This MPC is the propensity to consume goods and services produced in the state, which will obviously be somewhat less than the propensity to consume goods and services produced anywhere, whether in-state or out.
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In turn, this first round of respending on goods and services produced in the state will yield more respending, and so on in subsequent rounds. If the initial spending on states and goods was $X, the ultimate effect on state output would be the infinite sum $X(1 + MPC + MPC 2 + MPC 3 + …), which equals $X/(1 − MPC). The factor 1/(1 − MPC) is the "multiplier" of the initial spending change, translating it into an overall effect on state output. This multiplier is commonly encountered in undergraduate macroeconomics courses that include some exposition of Keynesian macroeconomic theory.
How about the cost per job created? This depends upon the ratio of state output, or "value added," to state jobs, along with the state multiplier factor. We would expect the number of jobs created by an initial public spending increase of $X to be equal to the total output increase, multiplied by the ratio of jobs to value added in the state. These tax cut multipliers and costs per job should also be used for public spending that is in the form of income transfers. Economists regard income transfers as equivalent to negative taxes. In analyzing their effects on local job creation, what is relevant is that public spending that is in the form of income transfers, unlike public spending that directly provides some good or service, does not directly increase output or employment, but only indirectly does so through whatever effect on local demand occurs because of increased public transfers. Therefore, public spending on income transfers is more analogous to the effects of tax cuts than to the effects of public spending on goods or services.
In the real world, multipliers and costs per job created will differ from this simplistic theory because of various complications, including the following:
• Cost feedback effects. As spending increases or tax cuts boost a state's economy, this will increase wages of state residents, as well as housing and other local prices. These wage and price increases will have some negative effects on business location decisions. As a result, the cost per job created from spending increases or tax cuts will go up.
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• Labor intensity effects. Public spending increases or tax cuts may favor industries that are either more or less labor intense than the average industry. A shift toward more labor-intensive industries will boost multipliers and lower costs per jobs, and vice versa for a shift toward less labor-intensive industries.
• Delayed housing and other capital accelerator effects. In the short run, boosts to state demand may be accommodated more by boosts to labor input, with less effect on the capital stock, which will lower costs per job created. In the medium run, boosts to demand will lead to larger adjustments to the capital stock to catch up with output demand, which will provide temporary boosts to the state economy, increasing output multipliers of fiscal shocks and potentially lowering costs per job created.
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• Agglomeration and other scale economy effects. As a state's economy expands because of public spending increases or tax cuts, this may affect the overall productivity of the economy. For example, a larger economy can afford to provide more specialized goods internally, which may increase the state's productivity as well as increase the MPC for goods produced in the state.
• Program-specific/policy-specific productivity effects. The specific types of spending increases or tax cuts may matter quite a bit if specific spending programs or tax policies have effects on state productivity. For example, infrastructure spending may raise the productivity of state businesses, which will attract additional businesses, thereby increasing multipliers and lowering the public spending cost per job created.
As another example, on the tax side, tax cuts that increase the return to work-for example by expanding the state Earned Income Tax Credit-may boost state 6 residents' labor supply, which will increase multipliers and lower costs of creating jobs by way of tax cuts.
Traditionally, state fiscal multipliers for spending increases and tax cuts were derived from various regional econometric models. These regional econometric models were empirically based, but only in part. The empirical basis is that some of the parameters underlying the estimated multiplier numbers were based on data. For example, regional input-output models are based on data on whether businesses or households purchase goods and services locally or elsewhere, and on what those purchases are. More sophisticated regional econometric models such as the REMI model also incorporate feedback effects from state growth yielding higher local wages and housing prices (Treyz, Rickman, and Shao 1992) . On the other hand, these data and estimates are then plugged into a model that generates the multiplier based on assumptions about the structure of the economy. In other words, in these regional econometric models, state fiscal multipliers are not estimated directly, but rather inferred from a combination of estimated parameters with model structure assumptions. In addition to analyzing the effects of closing budget gaps, these fiscal policy multipliers/fiscal cost per job numbers can be used to estimate the "balanced budget multiplier": how many jobs would be created by a balanced budget increase in both taxes and public
spending. An increase of $X in both taxes and public spending would destroy some jobs because of the tax increases and create some jobs because of the public spending increase. Bartik [2015] ).
Therefore, the likely social benefits for state workers from a new job paying $59,431 is about 40 percent of that amount, or $23,773. This is only 13 percent of the likely cost of creating one job in a balanced budget fashion of $185,591. Given that total costs of a proposed public program will exceed the wage costs, the "balanced budget multiplier" only modestly affects the benefitcost analysis of most government programs.
For example, in my 2011 book on preschool, Investing in Kids, I considered the claim of some advocates of preschool that there are large economic benefits to be reaped from preschool due solely to the program spending money on hiring adults to teach and run preschools (Bartik 2011) . While this is true if a state receives the revenue needed to support preschool from some outside source (the federal government, a foundation), the economic benefits are estimated to be small if a state funds its preschool program from its own taxes. In the 2011 book, I estimated that the "balanced budget" job creation benefits of preschool programs might provide benefits 9 amounting to 4 percent of a universal preschool program's costs. 8 My book argued that the main benefits that might justify preschool are the long-run effects on the former child participants.
NEW RESEARCH ON STATE/LOCAL FISCAL MULTIPLIERS
However, in recent years, and particularly since the debate over fiscal stimulus during the Great Recession, there has been a vast literature attempting to estimate fiscal multipliers of spending increases or tax cuts, at both the national and regional levels. But, as Smith (2017) points out in a blog post, simply referring to a "vast literature" does not provide convincing proof that readers can verify. What is needed are specific references to a few good papers that make verifiable claims about the topic and that are consistent with the overall literature's consensus.
Therefore, rather than simply referring to a "vast" literature, let me identify, within the regional fiscal multipliers literature, three exemplary papers: Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) These three papers are "exemplary" because they identify the causal effects of spending or tax changes using plausibly exogenous changes in spending or taxes due to "natural experiments." Nakamura and Steinsson predict variations in federal military procurement spending by state or region that are due to changes in national military procurement spending, coupled with various measures of how responsive each state or region would be expected to be to 8 The benefits are somewhat smaller here than implied previously in this paper, as my 2011 book assumed smaller social benefits of job creation due to assumed fade-out of these social benefits over time. This is even more surprising because the public spending estimates in Suárez Serrato and
Wingender, although they are mostly due to public spending on goods and services, also include some public spending on transfers, for which we would expect higher costs per job created.
Why are the public spending costs per job created in the new estimates lower? One can speculate that this might occur because of various positive feedback effects not reflected in traditional regional econometric or regional input-output models. For example, these lower costs per job created of public spending could be due to effects of public spending that stem from housing or other capital stock accelerators, general agglomeration economies, or programspecific effects of public spending on local productivity.
The new Zidar estimates of fiscal multipliers of tax cuts are also surprising. Tax cuts for the bottom 90 percent have much larger fiscal multiplier effects on job creation than expected, 12 based on prior regional econometric models, leading to surprisingly low costs per job created. In fact, the costs per job created are only slightly greater than the public spending estimates of Suárez Serrato and Wingender. Also surprising is that tax cuts for the top 10 percent have no impact.
What can explain the large tax cut effects found in Zidar? Upon reflection, these estimates make sense. As Zidar argues, tax cuts for the bottom 90 percent might be expected, under various specific tax policies, to have some direct effects in boosting local productivity.
Zidar argues that the high tax cut multiplier for this income group might be due to labor supply responses and liquidity constraints. This income group might have more elastic labor supply in response to changes in net wages than has traditionally been incorporated into regional modelsfor example, the labor supply of this income group might respond negatively to increases in Social Security and Medicare payroll tax increases and positively to increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit. In addition, if this group in recent years has been increasingly liquidity constrained with high debts, low assets, and little excess disposable income, the MPC of this group might be higher than traditionally assumed in regional models. In contrast, for the top 10 percent, whose income has increased the most in recent years, their income and liquidity might be high enough that their consumption of local goods does not respond much to tax shocks.
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In addition, one should note, as pointed out by Zidar, that the average tax cut multipliers for all income groups might be closer to prior estimates. Estimates from the Institute for Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) suggest than in the average state, about 58 percent of nonbusiness 13 Zidar's estimates, as constructed, reflect changes in federal tax liabilities for each group by state. Statespecific policies might have different effects if such state differentials lead to migration effects-for example, for the top 10 percent. I consider this issue in an appendix and conclude that the likely job creation effects of migration responses of the top 10 percent are small enough that the cost per job created for state tax changes for this group are likely to be quite large. 13 taxes are paid by the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution, and 42 percent by the top 10 percent.
14 The average cost per job created from an average tax cut divided in this manner would be a little less than twice as great as the tax-cut cost per job for the bottom 90 percent, at $67,262. 15 This estimate is closer to what is produced by some regional econometric models.
Where it differs is in emphasizing the importance of how tax changes are distributed across the income distribution.
IMPLICATIONS OF NEW FISCAL MULTIPLIERS FOR STATE POLICIES
These new estimates have potential implications for a wide variety of state policies.
Consider the original Orszag/Stiglitz issue: if a state faces a budget deficit because of a recession, what is the best way to close that budget gap? We assume that all else being equal, the state government wants to minimize the job losses that will result from the demand-side effects of closing the state budget deficit. Under the new estimates, if a state wants to minimize job loss, the best course of action is to increase taxes on the top 10 percent of the income distribution. The next best is to raise taxes on the bottom 90 percent. The worst alternative is to cut public spending. However, whether it is better to raise taxes on the bottom 90 percent or cut public spending is a close call-either choice is similar in the effects it has on job destruction.
Therefore, compared to the traditional Orszag/Stiglitz advice, the new advice places even more 14 emphasis on raising the right types of taxes, not overall taxes. Furthermore, this new advice is accompanied by more specific multiplier job creation estimates per dollar of budget-gap closing.
Next, consider the balanced budget multiplier. The new estimates imply that a balanced budget increase in public spending, financed by taxes on the lowest 90 percent of the income distribution, will have little effect in creating jobs. In contrast, a balanced budget increase in public spending, financed by increased taxes on the top 10 percent of the income distribution, Do these balanced-budget multiplier effects have a low enough cost per job that state budget increases will pass a benefit-cost test solely based on their job creation potential? The answer: not on average, but possibly in depressed areas or for public spending that targets job creation for the unemployed. As mentioned, we would expect that job creation in a state would yield benefits for state residents, due to increases in employment to population ratios and wages, that would be expected to average about 40 percent of wages. As mentioned already in this paper, average wages in the United States per FTE job were $59,431, so the social benefits for state workers of creating one job would be expected to average $23,773. This is 70 percent of the balanced budget multiplier cost of creating one job because of public spending increases that are financed by taxes on the top 10 percent.
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However, these balanced-budget multiplier effects are high enough that they might significantly affect the benefit-cost analysis of many proposed public programs. For example, if, apart from job creation effects, a proposed public program would have a benefit-cost ratio of 0.50, or fifty cents on the dollar, the addition of job creation benefits equal to 70 percent of costs would push the benefit-cost ratio to 1.20. A program that failed a benefit-cost test, but offered some significant benefits relative to costs, would be tipped to the point where its net benefits become positive. 19 I have used similar figures in previous work-for example, see Bartik (2016) . These calculations are derived from the average long-run elasticity of businesses with respect to state and local business taxes, and assumptions about the multiplier effect of incented jobs. For some representative calculations, see the appendix. 20 With this batting average and multiplier, about one net new job is created for every five jobs incented, and the annual job creation costs will be five times the cost of incentives per job year, or 5 times 2,600, or $13,000. See appendix for more detailed calculations.
General state and local business tax cuts would be expected to have even greater long-run costs per job created, as they go to all sectors of the state economy, not just the state's exportbase firms. (In other words, one doesn't expect state and local business tax cuts for fast-food restaurants to generate many jobs, as their activity in a state is dictated more by the state's population and per capita income, which determine demand for fast food, than by their business taxes.) Therefore, for general state and local business tax cuts, offsets from spending cuts, or offsets from tax increases for the bottom 90 percent of the population, might eliminate an even greater share of the long-run job creation effects of the business tax cuts. In the short run, we would expect the private business sector and the state economy to only gradually adjust to the lower business costs brought about by business tax cuts, whereas the fiscal multiplier effects of spending cuts or household tax increases would be more immediate. Under most plausible scenarios, the short-run effect of a business tax cut financed by public spending decreases, or by tax increases in the personal taxes of the bottom 90 percent, would be a net destruction of state jobs.
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Of course, one could dispute the exact amount of these offsets to business tax incentives or business tax cuts. There are uncertainties about how sensitive business location decisions are to incentives or business tax cuts. There are uncertainties in the multiplier estimates from Zidar (2017) and Suárez Serrato and Wingender (2016) . The important bottom line conclusion is that these fiscal multipliers are plausibly high enough that the financing of state business tax incentives or business tax cuts can significantly reduce their job creation effects, or even result in net job destruction in the short run.
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Zidar's estimates also have important implications for overall state tax policy.
Redistributing some taxes from the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution to the top 10 percent would be estimated to create jobs. The estimate is that each $39,177 that is so redistributed would create one net job in the state. Presumably this finding is valid only within the range of variation of relative tax rates on these groups in his estimation sample, so one wouldn't want to assume that such an economic policy would work if we went well beyond the observed range of how state tax policies distribute taxes across the income distribution. But within that range, income redistribution via state tax policy would be expected to have positive effects on job creation.
CONCLUSION
The overall lesson from this recent research is that state budget and tax policy must consider demand effects. State public spending, and the level and distribution of state and local taxes, has potential fiscal multiplier effects that are large. These large fiscal multiplier effects can yield effects on state jobs that have large effects on state residents' well-being. These demand and job creation effects are large enough that they affect the benefit-cost analysis of many state policies.
Considering demand effects of state spending and taxes is a departure from traditional public finance analysis. Demand effects are customarily considered at the federal level, as the federal government can run budget deficits that can have important macroeconomic effects. The tradition at the state and local levels has been to assume that demand effects can largely be ignored, as being second-order effects that largely offset given balanced budget requirements.
Based on this new fiscal multiplier research, this traditional assumption should be reexamined. 
Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) Estimates
The cost-per-job estimates in this paper are based on the 1.81 multiplier for states reported for employment in Nakamura and Steinsson's Table 3 
Suárez Serrato and Wingender (2016) Estimates
The calculations begin with their central cost estimate that the cost of creating one private sector job by federal government spending shocks is $30,785 (Table 2, 
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However, this calculation does not count the jobs directly created by spending in the public sector. I assume that such jobs are created at a cost per job equal to value added per state and local general government FTE worker, which was $99,582 in 2015.
Combining these estimates, the cost of creating FTE jobs in both the private and public sector is C/(P+G), where C is the government spending, P is private sector FTE jobs created, and G is government jobs created. Dividing both top and bottom by C and rearranging yields C/(P+G) = 1/((P/C) + (G/C)) = 1/((1/(C/P)) + (1/(C/G))) = 1/((1/$51,542) + (1/$99,582)). This calculation yields a cost per FTE job, including both private and government jobs, of $33,963. To translate this fiscal multiplier into a cost per FTE job, the negative of the derivative of the change in tax cost per FTE job will be given by (1/3.42) times the ratio of GDP to FTE employment. This implicitly assumes that the change in FTE employment will in percentage terms be the same as the change in all employment. This is done using values from 2013, which is 2015 lagged by two years. We then adjust to 2015 dollars using the ratio of the CPI-U-RS in the two years. Therefore, the cost per job = (1/3.42) times ($16.692 
Zidar (2017) Estimates

Cost Per Job from Incentives
This calculation is similar to what has been done previously in Bartik (2016) . However, the cost per job figures reported here are somewhat lower because I use a somewhat higher tax elasticity (in absolute value). I use a tax elasticity of −0.33 for business location decisions rather than −0.20, which was used in Bartik (2016) . This tax elasticity is the long-run elasticity of business activity in a state and local area relative to all state and local business taxes. In the current context, I use a tax elasticity holding public services constant, which is relevant in calculating business location responses before allowing for the effects of the business incentive's financing. The mean value of this elasticity reported in Bartik (1991) is −0.33 (Table 2. 3).
The implicit assumption used is that the effects of business costs on new firm location decisions, in percentage terms, will be the same as the long-run business tax elasticity. This is the assumption implicitly adopted in reporting the results used in Bartik (1991) , and both Wasylenko (1997) and Phillips and Goss (1995) find no evidence that the micro elasticities so calculated differ from the aggregate long-run elasticities.
If this is the case, then the cost in forgone taxes per job created can be written as follows:
Here, T represents state and local business taxes per job, and dlnE/dlnT is the long-run elasticity of business activity with respect to state and local business taxes.
As shown by Bartik (2017) and by Ernst and Young (Phillips, Sallee, and Peak 2016) implicit assumption is that incentives, which will generally have costs per job-year of $5,000 or less, will yield an effect on location probabilities that is consistent with that cost per incented job.
However, this calculation does not count multiplier jobs. If we assume the multiplier is 2, the cost per total job (incented plus multiplier jobs) will be half as great, or $13,429.
Obviously, we can get quite different values either from assuming different business tax elasticities or from assuming different multipliers. But the point remains that the financing effects for incentives may often be significant in determining the net cost per job created.
Cost Per Job from Business Tax Cuts
For business tax cuts, we use the same long-run elasticity of business activity with respect to state and local business tax cuts. So, the long-run cost per job is given by the same However, what differs here are two factors: 1) value added per FTE job is lower for businesses overall than for export-base businesses, so state and local business taxes will be lower, and 2) a multiplier effect will not apply to a cut to overall state and local business taxes, as the estimated elasticities in the research literature already implicitly incorporate such effects.
Value added per FTE job for the overall private business sector averaged $139,868 in 2015, so state and local business taxes at 5 percent of value added would be $6,993, and $6,993 divided by 0.33 yields a long-run cost of business tax cuts per FTE job created of $21,192.
But this is the long-run cost per job. In general, we expect sluggish adjustment of the private economy to new, lower business costs. Suppose the adjustment is only 9 percent per year, as estimated in Helms (1985) , which is similar to what one gets in subsequent studies. Then the short-run cost per job created of business tax cuts, holding financing cost constant, will be over 10 times as great, or over $200,000 per job in the short run. Clearly, the fiscal multiplier effects estimated by Suárez Serrato and Wingender, or by Zidar, are sufficiently large to more than outweigh these short-run incentive effects.
One possible counterargument is that the business tax cut will have its own multiplier effects. However, the direct fiscal multiplier is likely to be slight, given two factors: 1) much of the business earnings flow out of state, and 2) most of the business earnings that stay in state are likely to go to the top 10 percent of the income distribution. Zidar's results suggest that shocks to the income of this top 10 percent group do not substantially affect local economies.
Alternatively, one could argue that there might be some direct shifting of business tax burdens that occurs immediately, without intermediary effects on economic variables. In most equilibrium models of tax-base shifting, such shifting occurs only indirectly. For instance, if some policy change, such as lower business taxes, financed either by lower public spending or higher nonbusiness taxes, leads to changes in labor demand relative to labor supply, this might lead to changes in wages that will shift some of the burden of the taxes. But if shifting occurs immediately and directly-that is, as soon as business taxes are lowered in a state-this leads firms to increase the wages they pay workers, as a form of rent sharing. Under those assumptions, then, the lower business taxes may have some spending multiplier effects through their direct effects on workers. However, unless such shifting is immediate and involves a very large percentage of business taxes, it is still quite likely that the short-term fiscal multiplier losses from public spending cuts, or from increases in taxes for the bottom 90 percent, will outweigh the short-run effects of business tax cuts in incentivizing additional state business activity.
Cost Per Job from Migration Effects of State Tax Changes for Top Income Groups
Zidar's estimates are based on changes in federal tax liability for income class by state.
Because these changes reflect changes in federal tax liability, we would not expect such tax changes to lead to large migration responses. Moretti and Wilson estimate the influence of net income after taxes at the ninety-ninth percentile of income on the migration of star scientists, who are "defined as scientists . . . with patent counts in the top 5 percent of the distribution." They estimate a highly statistically significant elasticity of such location decisions. Specifically, they estimate that if a state's tax changes in its personal income tax system lead to a "permanent 1 percent increase in the net-oftax rate for personal income," this "would lead to a 6 percent increase in the stock of scientists by the end of year t + 10." This increase in the stock of scientists reflects both demand and supply responses, and can be interpreted as a 6 percent increase in the number of employed scientists after 10 years. using the CPI-U-RS data series.) Therefore, the second term simplifies to 4.3 percent times $1,645,891 times 123.1/126.2 = $68,687. This is the revenue gain collected from one more job that is attracted to the state by lower personal state tax rates, or the revenue loss from one more job that is repelled from the state by higher personal state tax rates.
The first term has Y * H in the numerator. The denominator dJ/dTs can be related to the elasticities estimated by Moretti and Wilson, as follows:
Here, Tf is the effective federal tax rate that is applicable to the personal income of the top 1 percent of households, and state personal income taxes are assumed to be deducted before Considering these results together, it seems unlikely that the migration responses to cutting taxes on the top 1 percent will be sufficient to imply a low revenue cost per FTE job created. The cost per job created ranges from extremely high values of over −$5 million to a still very large cost of over −$186,000.
Cost per migrant-created job could be lowered if it was legally or politically feasible to target tax relief to particularly mobile groups-for example, to give state income tax relief only to top scientists. But this approach appears to be of dubious feasibility.
